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ABSTRACT
!e Norman conquest of Sicily detached the island from its North African framework, 
and a century of Latin Christian rule e"ectively transformed its society. But the island 
was not completely disconnected from the southern Mediterranean, as long term trade 
contacts, political links and military ambitions intervened to cast relations between the 
two sides. A Norman thalassocracy in the mid-12th century created a short-lived politi-
cal bridge between Europe and Africa. In the age of the crusades, regional forces across 
the central Mediterranean could not be contained within the model of direct Christian 
rule experimented in the Latin east. !e present chapter studies the transition from in-
formal control to the establishment of direct rule, which led to the formation of a ‘Nor-
man Ifrīqiya’. !e short-lived Norman overlordship across Ifrīqiya was mainly recorded 
in the pages of medieval Muslim historians, conditioning the methodology used by its 
modern historians. !e study of Norman Ifrīqiya became possible thanks to a remark-
able Muslim historiographic e"ort to explain Christian intervention in the a"airs of 
Ifrīqiya, underlining the historian’s powerful role as arbiter. It is the Muslim historian 
who becomes the main narrator of Sicily’s ‘other Kingdom’.
It-tmexxija Normanna ta’ Sqallija begħdet l-ikbar gżira Mediterranja mid-dinja tal-Ma-
greb, waqt li matul is-seklu tnax is-soċjetà tagħha nbidlet mill-qiegħ. Biss il-ħakma Nor-
manna ma qatgħetx il-kummerċ, il-kuntatti politiċi u anke l-ambizzjonijiet militari tal-
gżira l-Magreb. It-talassokrazija Normanna f ’nofs is-seklu tnax bniet għal xi żmien pont 
politiku bejn l-Ewropa u l-Aika. Fl-era tal-kruċjati, il-mudell Palestinjan ta’ tmexxija 
diretta nisranija f ’art Musulmana, ma rnexxiex ċ-ċentru tal-Mediterran. Dan l-artiklu 
jistħarreġ il-bidla minn kontroll informali għal tmexxija diretta, li wasslet għall-ħolqien 
ta’ l-Iīqijja Normanna. It-tagħrif dwar in-Normanni -Iīqijja ġej prinċipalment minn 
kittieba Musulmani, fatt li jikkondizzjona l-metodoloġija ta’ l-istoriċi moderni. L-istudju 
ta’ l- Iīqijja Normanna jista’ jsir bis-saħħa ta’ l-istorjograja Musulmana, li tat is-setgħa 
lill-istoriku jagħżel kif jirrakkonta l-intervent nisrani -Iīqijja. L-istoriku Musulman 
jieħu postu bħala n-narratur ewlieni ta’ din is-‘saltna l-oħra’ ta’ Sqallija.
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!e Norman conquest of Sicily, completed by 1091, shi$ed the largest Mediterranean 
island away from the sphere of in%uence of the eastern Maghrib, integrating it into 
a new Latin Christian framework1. !e Norman conquerors took their place in the 
former capital of the Kalbite emirs, garrisoned castles and strongpoints, and estab-
lished a network of lay and ecclesiastical Latin Christian lordships. !e value of Sicily 
as a springboard for the wider Mediterranean ambitions of Robert Guiscard Duke of 
Apulia, Calabria and Sicily, and his brother Roger I Count of Sicily became evident 
even before the island had been fully occupied by the Normans. Short-term gains out-
side Sicily and southern Italy were, nevertheless, overshadowed by the task of consoli-
dating the Norman conquests there. Almost half a century a$er the fall of Palermo 
(1071), Roger’s son and successor Roger II undertook the di&cult and protracted task 
to weld together Sicily and the Norman lands in southern Italy into a newly-established 
Kingdom of Sicily. !roughout the 1130s, Sicily’s resources were stretched to the limits 
as it fought to quell rebellions in southern Italy and to repel the invasion of an interna-
tional coalition led by Pope and Emperor.
From 1052 onwards, Ifrīqiya – the province of Africa, denoting an extensive region 
including modern day Tunisia –  was devastated by the Banu Hilāl and the Banu Su-
laym, invading tribesmen dispatched by the Fatimid Caliph against the insubordinate 
North Africans who were abandoning the Shiite cult. !e ancient capital al-Qayrawān 
was destroyed in 1057, and the civil strife greatly weakened the African emirates. !e 
long-term e"ects of the invasions have been the subject of historical discussion2. In a 
sense, al-Qayrawān’s tragedy worked to the advantage of other areas in the provincial 
economy. It is clear that Ibn Khaldūn’s depiction of the tribesmen falling on the Magh-
rib like a “swarm of locusts” has to be taken with a pinch of salt; Ifrīqiya remained a sig-
ni/cant market for the Saharan trade in gold, slaves and other commodities in the 11th 
and 12th centuries3. !e town of al-Mahdīya was an important provincial terminal for 
the trans-Saharan gold trade. Nevertheless, many historians followed Ibn Khaldūn in 
looking at the events of the 1050s as a catastrophic blow for the Maghrib, in many areas 
causing large-scale abandonment of land cultivation and leaving a long trail of chaos 
and destruction. !e Arab tribesmen are said to have brought the Zīrids to their knees, 
and greatly weakened the neighbouring Hammādids. Although the Hilāli invasions 
are not the subject of this chapter, they cannot be dismissed as one amongst the sev-
eral factors which weakened Ifrīqiya by undermining its political unity, inviting future 
Christian expansion in the region4. !e North African troubles favoured the Normans 
in Sicily, not only because Zīrid resources were drastically curtailed, but also because 
periodic famines increased African dependence on the Sicilian granaries5.
!e Norman conquest did not detach Sicily completely from its former North African 
coordinates, as the Norman rulers were quick to organize grain shipments to north 
African ports, and sealed their lucrative control of this activity via trading agreements 
with the Zīrid authorities, e"ective from 1076. As is well known, Roger I refused to 
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support the Christian attack on al-Mahdīya in 1087, citing his trade agreement with 
the Zīrid state. Sicilian immigrants in Ifrīqiya retained links with their co-religionists 
subjected to Norman rule, while some late Jewish trading contacts on both sides were 
attested in the documents of the Cairo Geniza. !is chapter studies the strategic shi$ 
in Sicilian-African relations from commercial cooperation to confrontation. !e tran-
sition from informal control to the establishment of direct rule, enabled the forma-
tion of a ‘Norman Ifrīqiya’ – which really amounted to a constellation of Norman-held 
towns along coastal Ifrīqiya. Whilst one Christian source announced prematurely the 
Norman conquest of ‘Africa’ as early as 1135, Arabic sources commenting about Sicily’s 
involvement in Africa were careful to distinguish the various steps leading from the 
initial confrontation, to the stage of commercial cooperation, onward to the reduction 
of the Zīrid state to a Norman satellite, and the establishment of direct political control 
over key parts of it.
CONQUERORS AND CONQUERED AT AFRICA’S DOORSTEP
!e Norman occupation of Sicily altered the balance of power in the central Mediter-
ranean, pushing the Christian frontier with Islam southwards. !e scale of this shi$ 
became increasingly evident in the course of the 12th century, as the island’s politi-
cal, social, and economic structures were irreversibly realigned by the Christian ruling 
class6. Reshu:ing the cultural elements, the various forces gradually converged to cre-
ate a new society.
Could these changes be extended to the other side of the Mediterranean, along the 
North African coasts? Roger I annexed the Maltese islands in 1091, a feat perhaps re-
peated by his son Roger II; while Pantelleria was taken in 1123, and Djerba in 1135. 
Early signs of a central Mediterranean thalassocracy were already exhibited in Guis-
card’s extended Byzantine ambitions, a&rmed in the temporary occupation of Corfù 
and Durazzo; and in Roger I’s annexation of Malta, described in detail by Geo"rey 
Malaterra. !e Sicilian thalassocracy is evident in the leading accounts of the Norman 
capture, and subsequent loss, of key parts of Ifrīqiya in the 1140s-1150s7.
“Great of heart and ever full of ambition”, as described by Romuald of Salerno, Roger 
II like his father seemed to epitomize the Norman warrior. But Roger II’s overlord-
ship also bridged di"erent cultural worlds8. Whether, or how far, Roger II intended 
contemporary western Europe to take his status as “king of Africa” seriously, is a moot 
point – the terms rex Aicae and malik Iīqiya (as he was described on a quadrilingual 
tombstone at Palermo in 1148) were invoked in di"erent contexts, echoing Roger’s real 
power in the region. !e expansion of cAbd al-Mucmin’s Almohad empire into Ifrīqiya 
terminated any long-term Norman aspirations to North African lordship. Of equal sig-
ni/cance, the collapse of Norman Ifrīqiya in the wake of Almohad expansion by 1160 
provided a dismal backdrop to the next few decades in Sicily, which were marked by 
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ethnic strife and the disintegration of the forms of convivencia which had taken root 
there9. !e end of ‘Sicilian multiculturalism’, which had been displayed at court under 
Roger II and William I, was expressed in the island’s rapid Latinization by 1200.
A substantial literature has discussed Norman Sicily and its African ambitions in detail, 
identifying the main factors in the interplay between changes and continuities10. !e 
continuities with the Muslim past were actively present at di"erent levels. !e survival 
of large Muslim communities openly practising their faith was one consequence of the 
pragmatic policy adopted by the Norman conquerors. In both town and countryside, 
Muslims organized into distinct communities worked the land and practised cra$s, 
paying their taxes and living according to their laws. !e Norman government seemed 
to acknowledge key Muslims as community leaders, thereby permitting elements linked 
to the old Muslim ruling class to play a public role. Numerous Arabic speakers served 
the Christian rulers, while large bodies of Muslims were periodically called to arms. !e 
inclusion of North African models into the Norman administration of Sicily, as well 
as the application of Arabic as one of the languages of government, would underline 
this pragmatic approach11. It was epitomized in the multicultural environment of the 
Norman court, centred around Christian rulers ‘dressed like Muslims’ and surrounded 
by palace Saracens. Beyond the palace walls, more than a century a$er the fall of the 
Sicilian capital, a ‘Muslim Palermo’ visited by the Spanish traveller Ibn Jubayr existed 
alongside the other communities in the city12.
All the same, Norman rule had wrought long-term, irreversible changes. !e Muslim 
population of Sicily was subjected to Christian rule, and had to come to terms with 
this reality. Personal freedoms varied substantially according to social position and eco-
nomic status, but those sectors of the Muslim population who could emigrate from 
Sicily to North African lands, did so. An undetermined percentage of the former Mus-
lim population was absorbed into the emerging Christian mainstream. Ibn Jubayr did 
not fail to record his meetings with notable Muslims who expressed their discontent. 
Despite the survival of a ‘Muslim Palermo’ in 1185, in the late 12th century Islam was 
increasingly marginalized in the island’s life. !e Palermitan Muslims were recorded 
by Ibn Jubayr to be organized into a large community with their own leadership and 
tribunals, enjoying access to free market activities. Nevertheless, the Muslim situation 
in the Sicilian capital seemed to have been the exception, rather than the rule. Decades 
of intermittent ethnic and religious violence undermined the multicultural experiment 
of Norman Sicily. !e surviving Muslim communities were gradually enclaved – and, 
from 1189, rose in open rebellion against Christian rule13.
SICILIAN TRADE, ITALIAN CRUSADE
In the 11th century, the central Mediterranean was a signi/cant arena of Christian-
Muslim con%ict. A joint Genoese-Pisan expedition in 1016 freed Sardinia from a large 
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Spanish Muslim armada led by a Muslim emir, al-Mujāhid, who had taken much of 
the island in 1015. Later Christian raids included the Pisan strikes against the north 
African seaport of Bône (present-day Annaba) in 1034 and the Sicilian capital city, Pal-
ermo, in 1063. !e joint military e"ort witnessed in Sardinia in 1016 – an intervention 
which paved the way for substantial and long-term Pisan and Genoese activities in that 
island – was repeated in 1087 in the Genoese-Pisan strike against al-Mahdīya.
!e Italian maritime republics sacked the Zīrid capital and its suburb, az-Zawīla. !e 
1087 campaign, which also included Roman and Amal/tan forces, foreshadowed the 
First Crusade. “It was as a peregrinatio, or pilgrimage, that the Gesta Francorum under-
stood the expedition of 1096-9 to liberate the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem”, remarks 
H.E.J. Cowdrey. “But in 1087 . . . the Pisans already wore pilgrim insignia as they pre-
pared themselves to /ght. Pilgrimage and holy war were evidently drawing together”14. 
!e author of the Carmen in victoria Pisanorum, the Pisan victory poem, was careful 
to point this out.
On their way to North Africa, the joint forces made a stop at Pantelleria. !e Pisan vic-
tory poem described the attack as follows: 
Navigating the sea they reached an island called Pantelleria [which was endowed] with a 
strong fortress; its inhabitants dispatched pigeons with letters informing Timinus about 
the large %eet. [Both] nature and man made the castle there astonishing, unlike any other 
castle in the world; two thousand men held the citadel, acknowledging neither God nor 
human virtue. [!e Christians] landed there amazed at the buildings, and constructed very 
tall wooden towers; they destroyed and killed as God wished, and did what no one in the 
world may believe. I reckon only six men of those who came forth survived; they sent other 
pigeons with news about what had happened. King Timinus despaired upon learning this, 
and, troubled by the news, sought to negotiate with princes.
!e Muslim chroniclers an-Nuwayrī and Ibn al-Athīr, also recorded the event: 
!is year the Rūm put together [a %eet of ] four hundred ships, and, assisted by the Franks, 
they all sailed to Pantelleria, which they depredated, devastated and burned. !ey then 
captured the city of az-Zawīla next to al-Mahdīya. !e troops of Tamīm [Tamīm ibn al-
Mucizz ibn Bādīs, Zīrid ruler from 1062 to 1108] had gone out [of al-Mahdīya] to suppress 
a revolt. !erefore [Tamīm] made peace with the Rūm, paying them eighty thousand dinār, 
on condition they hand back all the captives they had taken. Having done this, they all 
returned home15.
 !e description by an-Nuwayrī is echoed by Ibn al-Athīr, who claimed that the armada 
of the Pisans and Genoese, “both Frankish [in nationality]”, took “four years” to put 
together, and that Pantelleria was their meeting place. Both Muslim authors dated the 
Christian expedition against Pantelleria, az-Zawīla and al-Mahdīya to the Muslim year 
481 (= 27 March 1088-15 March 1089).
Moreover, in the Kitāb al-Bayān al-Maghrib Ibn cAdhārī dated the attack by the Rūm 
on al-Mahdīya to 480 (=8 April 1087-26 March 1088). According to Ibn cAdhārī, who 
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made no mention of the sack of Pantelleria, the Italians reached Africa with a %eet of 
three hundred warships and thirty thousand /ghters on board. !e author claimed that 
the Zīrid army was employed in /ghting away from al-Mahdīya and that the towns-
men lacked arms and munitions to defend themselves. Ill advised by squabbling min-
isters, the Zīrid prince had refused to heed warnings about the coming invasion, and 
the walls of al-Mahdīya were reportedly le$ derelict. !is explanation was repeated by 
at-Tigānī, who reported that the Christians took the King’s tribute payment but sailed 
away with the women and children. Tamīm paid the invaders a handsome tribute of 
eighty thousand gold dinārs according to an-Nuwayrī; the /gure may be exaggerated, 
but the reference to the payment of tribute is in itself a signi/cant element in the his-
tory of Ifrīqiya16.
!e Normans were conspicuous by their absence in the events of 1087. According to 
Geo"rey Malaterra, the Pisans, realizing they lacked the men and the means to govern 
and garrison al-Mahdīya, o"ered the lordship of the city to Roger of Sicily. !e Nor-
man count quickly turned down the o"er, citing a peace pact he had made with Tamīm. 
Malaterra had this to say on the event:
While this was happening, the Pisans who had travelled to Africa to do commerce became 
the victims of reprisals. !ey put an army together and took by storm the city of King Temi-
nus and obtained all of it except the main fortress where the king himself was holding out 
[the Qasr al-Mahdī, according to at-Tigānī]. He bravely prevented the attackers, who were 
not in su&cient numbers, from keeping hold of the city which they had sacked. So they 
sent representatives to the Count of Sicily, who was very powerful and had the means to 
carry out these things, enquiring whether he desired to have the city [for himself ]. However 
[Roger] had already made a peace treaty with King Teminus and was committed to honour 
it, so he upheld the agreement and turned down the o"er as it was against Teminus’s inter-
ests. When King Teminus was no longer able to defend himself by means of arms, he o"ered 
money in exchange for peace. !e [Christian] %eet le$ his realms a$er receiving his money. 
Nonetheless he swore according to his faith not to attack any Christian land in future, and 
to release all his Christian captives17.
!e details of Roger’s treaty with Tamīm may be conjectured. Since 1076, an agreement 
with Roger I of Sicily had given Tamīm’s subjects access to Sicilian grain. A peaceful 
commercial exchange presupposed the cessation of hostilities between the two sides. 
!e agreement was pro/table, and it gave Roger a free hand in the /nal stages of his 
campaign against the Muslims of Sicily. At the time of the Genoese-Pisan attack, Rog-
er’s forces were besieging Muslim Agrigento. !e Zīrid ruler organized raids against 
Nicotera and Mazara in 1074 and 1075 and, as late as 1079-80, a North African squad-
ron was spotted o" Taormina, which was then besieged by Roger’s troops. But this 
did not deter the Christian advance in Sicily. Nor did it forestall the agreement, which 
was quite extraordinary in allowing peaceful exchange to lessen the Christian-Muslim 
divide. !e treaty was recalled by Ibn al-Athīr, with regard to Roger’s refusal to assist a 
large Frankish army to conquer Africa18.
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Ibn al-Athīr’s report, dated to AH 491 (=9 December 1097- 27 November 1098) is 
linked to an incident related to the Frankish conquest of Antioch. Recycling the inci-
dent of 1087, Ibn al-Athīr skilfully contrasted the political-religious discourse of the 
Frankish crusaders with the logic of pro/t. !e passage traces the emergence of Frank-
ish domination in the Mediterranean world, mentioning the fall of Toledo, the con-
quest of Sicily, and the temporary capture of footholds on the African mainland. !e 
Arab chronicler dated the Frankish incursion in Syria to 490 (=19 December 1096 – 8 
December 1097) and reported Baldwin’s request of assistance from Count Roger for 
the passage of a large Frankish army to conquer Africa. Roger’s counsellors urged him 
to cooperate with the Franks. Roger’s reaction is grotesque, raising his thigh to pass air, 
to show his disapproval. But the passage which followed revealed his clever diplomatic 
calculations:
When these Franks arrive here, a thousand ills will a:ict me: I would be forced to provide 
them with ships to transport them to Africa, and to send my own troops too. Now, sup-
pose they conquer the land and become its masters, they will control the trade in victuals 
instead of the Sicilians, and I would lose, to their advantage, the pro/t I make each year on 
the price of grain. If, on the contrary, they fail to achieve their objective, they would return 
to my land, and I shall be vexed with their presence. Moreover, Tamīm will tell me: “You 
have betrayed me; you have violated our pact”, and will discontinue our friendship and the 
commerce between Sicily and Africa. No: It is much better that this remains to our pro/t, 
until we feel strong enough to take Africa ourselves.
!en calling Baldwin’s ambassador, Roger told him “Since you propose to wage a Holy 
War against the Muslims, the noblest enterprise is the conquest of Jerusalem, which 
you will surely be able to free from Muslim domination, to your glory. With regard to 
Africa, know that I am bound by oaths and pacts stipulated with that people”19.
Ibn al-Athīr’s assertion that Roger redirected Baldwin’s attention from Africa towards 
Jerusalem may be unfounded, yet his text con/rms the main value of the agreement and 
provides an important insight into Roger’s character. By citing his treaty with Tamīm 
as the reason for not providing assistance to fellow Latin Christian warriors (the Italian 
attackers of 1087 and the Frankish delegation of 1096), Roger was upholding an agree-
ment with a Muslim lord well above his perceived duties as a Christian ruler. African 
gold permitted the Normans to consolidate their position as regional power brokers. 
One could argue that the arrangement between Sicily and Ifrīqiya developed from one 
of regional interdependence to a relationship of unequal exchange. !e exchange of 
grain for gold, grossly speaking, entrenched the rulers of Ifrīqiya in a situation of eco-
nomic dependence versus Sicily. !e Sicilian commissioners supervising the North Af-
rican customs houses became powerful agents of government, and the indebted Zīrid 
state was reduced to a form of economic protectorate by the treaty. Until the 1110s 
this regional arrangement was framed mainly in terms of commercial cooperation. In 
the 1120s the Zīrid state made an e"ort to break out of the vicious circle, to no avail. 
!e region moved towards a renewed legitimation of violence. From 1135, the Sicilian 
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protectorate over al-Mahdīya was consolidated, granting Roger II a free hand in oc-
cupying whole parts of coastal Ifrīqiya. To an extent, the way to the physical extension 
of a Sicilian lordship along the Ifrīqiyan coast in the 1140s was paved by decades of 
economic control.
CONQUERING A NORTH AFRICAN KINGDOM
A variety of factors contributed to step up Sicilian ambitions to formalize their regional 
hegemony. Sicily under Roger II was steered towards an adventurous but ultimately 
misguided foreign policy by the ruler and his admirals, including cAbd ar-Rahmān or 
Christodoulos, and George of Antioch. In particular, George of Antioch, a political 
exile who rose to serve as chief minister to Roger II, and to become a major exponent of 
the Sicilian thalassocracy20. In a sense, the new generation of leaders a$er Roger I and 
Temīm were drawn into the dominant political-religious discourse which governed the 
Muslim-Christian con%ict around the Mediterranean. !e regional balance of power 
which had rested on peaceful commercial exchange was challenged on the drawing 
board with stillborn plans in Ifrīqiya to regain Sicily, and upset in fact with a partly-
realized programme in Palermo to establish a Norman kingdom of Africa.
!e Normans learned how to exploit to their own advantage the factional divisions 
which weakened the control of the Zīrid prince of al-Mahdīya in other parts of Ifrīqiya. 
Sicilian-African hostilities broke out in 1117-18 when Roger II was called to assist the 
governor of Gabes against the emir of al-Mahdīya21. Signi/cantly, the con%ict was trig-
gered by a plan to attract foreign commerce to the port of Gabes, thereby challenging 
al-Mahdīya’s monopolist pretensions. According to Ibn al-Athīr, Roger exchanged bit-
terly-worded letters with the ambitious prince at al-Mahdīya, cAlī, leading the latter 
to invoke Almoravid help for the Muslim reconquest of Sicily22. Roger demanded the 
release of his trading agents, and the immediate renewal of the Sicilian-African agree-
ment, but it became increasingly clear that the Sicilians were determined to draw more 
political advantages as regional power brokers.
An ill-thought provocation soon provided the pretext for war when an Almoravid 
squadron attacked the Calabrian town of Nicotera in 1122, sailing away with captive 
women and children23. Knowing that Norman retribution was only a matter of time, 
the terri/ed rulers at al-Mahdīya contacted the Fātimid court in Egypt to intercede 
with Roger II on behalf of Ifrīqiya. George of Antioch was dispatched as Roger’s envoy 
to Egypt, but the diplomatic exchange did not halt the Sicilian war plans24. In 1123 
Roger II dispatched a %eet of three hundred ships, carrying an army led by ‘a thousand 
and one knights’, to capture al-Mahdīya25. !e Sicilian armada was dispersed by a storm; 
some ships reached Pantelleria. A large number of its men were killed, while the women 
and children were captured, and the island was annexed to Sicily. According to Ibn 
al-Athīr, when the Sicilian forces reached the African coast and took control of the cas-
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tle of ad-Dīmās, they were surprised by the determined Muslim resistance. Galvanized 
with cries of Akbar Allāh, the Muslims fell on the invaders, forcing the enemy troops 
to kill their own horses and %ee to their ships. !e Christian garrison of the castle of 
ad-Dīmās, lacking provisions and exhausted from constant battling, /nally surrendered 
and were killed to the last man. Abandoning the siege of al-Mahdīya, the remainder of 
the Sicilian forces sailed away26. Underlining the new discourse legitimating violence, 
Ibn al-Athīr remarked that this victory was celebrated around the Muslim world in 
verse by several poets. Four years later, another Almoravid force sacked Syracuse a$er 
making landings at Patti and Catania.
All the same, Muslim audacity did not bring an end to the Sicilian ruler’s role as re-
gional power broker. !e internal divisions of Ifrīqiya played in the hands of the Sicil-
ian thalassocrats. !e emir of al-Mahdīya enjoyed little e"ective authority outside his 
capital, and the provincial governors could not be expected to show loyalty towards 
the Zīrid prince. In an ironic twist, the same prince, al-Hasan ibn cAlī, who triumphed 
against the Sicilian invaders in 1123, was forced to invoke Roger’s protection in 1135 
to ward o" a Hammādid invasion27. Reportedly, it was the discontented subjects of the 
Ifrīqiyan vassal king who had appealed for the intervention of Yahyā, Hammādid emir 
of Bougie, in 1134. Following a successful intervention by the Sicilian %eet, Roger II 
obtained from al-Hasan extensive rights in Ifrīqiya, including the control of all customs 
revenues generated through trading activities, purportedly to ensure the regular collec-
tion of the Sicilian tributes. From 1135 onwards, al-Mahdīya was virtually Roger’s pro-
tectorate28. Forced to accept ignominious terms, al-Hasan e"ectively agreed to parti-
tion Ifrīqiya with Roger II by recognizing the latter’s right to impose Sicilian authority 
over those parts of Ifrīqiya which were not under direct Zīrid government. Moreover, 
Muslim communities which were to rise in revolt against Norman rule were to get no 
help from al-Mahdīya29.
George of Antioch captured the island of Djerba in 1135 a$er surrounding it with his 
ships. In a letter addressed to the Fātimid caliph in Egypt, Roger II explained that he 
had occupied Djerba to destroy its pirates, thereby protecting Sicilian shipping. George 
of Antioch’s occupation of Djerba, marked by the pillage of the island and the deporta-
tion of captive women and children to Sicily, con/rmed his thalassocratic ambitions30. 
Roger granted the surviving Djerban community the amān (or safe conduct) to ransom 
their relatives and friends. al-Idrīsī remarked, almost in justi/cation of the Sicilian occu-
pation, that the Berber kharijite inhabitants of Djerba were generally “brown-skinned, 
inclined towards evil and of a hypocritical character. [Both] the upper classes and the 
rest of population speak only Berber. !ey are wont to rebel and disobey”. Following 
their rebellion against Norman occupation in 1153, the Djerbans were “reduced to 
slavery and transported to Palermo”31.
A Norman-held Djerba, with a royal governor installed there, opened the way for fur-
ther expansion along the North African coast. It was also a consequence of a marked 
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shi$ in policy, from peaceful commercial cooperation to military intervention, al-
ready signalled in the failed Sicilian attack on al-Mahdīya. From 1123 to its capture by 
George of Antioch in 1148, the Zīrid capital was transformed into an economic and 
political satellite. Despite the consideration that the risks would outweigh the ben-
e/ts, and that gains would be made at too heavy a price, the Christian rulers of Sicily 
embarked on an expansionist programme in the Maghrib, formalizing the advantages. 
!e programme assumed the ability to establish, and manage in the long run, pro/table 
forms of overlordship as had been achieved in the wake of the Sicilian conquest. !ey 
must have known that the making of a Christian realm in Sicily was still very much a 
work in progress. Naturally, this expansionist policy entailed administrative and /nan-
cial restructuring at home.
!e Sicilian thalassocracy was consolidated under the “emir of emirs”, the chief minister 
George. According to al-Maqrīzī’s biography of George of Antioch (as translated by Jeremy 
Johns): ‘George amassed the revenues and organised the foundations of the kingdom. He 
veiled Roger from [his] subjects, and arranged for him to dress in clothes like the Muslims, 
and not to ride out, nor to show himself in public, except on holidays, when he would 
process, preceded by horses adorned with saddles of gold and silver, and with caparisons 
studded with gemstones, and by domed litters and gilded banners, with the parasol above 
him and the crown upon his head. George was entitled “exalted master, pleasing [to God], 
glory of the victorious king, pride of majesty, rule of leadership, leader of armies, honour of 
ministers, emir of emirs”32.
Allowing for the fact that al-Maqrīzī was writing in the 15th century, his biographical 
sketch of George of Antioch provides vital insight on Roger II and his chief minister. 
!e ‘orientalization’ of Roger II’s image, court, and trilingual administration, and the 
extension of Norman lordship to parts of Ifrīqiya, were, in a sense, an acknowledgment 
of the strategic location of the Norman kingdom as a bridge between civilizations. 
Whilst nourishing wider ambitions in the Latin East – claiming, unsuccessfully, the 
principality of Antioch a$er Bohemond II’s death in 1130 – Roger’s best opportunity 
for Mediterranean expansion seemed to lie southwards. !ese ambitions had immedi-
ate international reverberations – in 1135 it was reported at a German imperial meet-
ing by alarmed Byzantine and Venetian envoys that Roger had taken “Africa, which is 
known to be a third part of the world”33.
!e 1140s were very di&cult years for Ifrīqiya, which was troubled by large scale fam-
ine, as well as the plague. According to Ibn al-Athīr, the “great mortality” struck the 
country in 1142-3, killing many people, while those with means %ed to Sicily, “where 
they met with cruel su"erings”34.
Recurring famines which a:icted Ifrīqiya constrained al-Mahdīya to depend increas-
ingly on Sicilian grain shipments, forcing the emir al-Hasan to sink deeper in debt 
with Roger. In a show of force, in 1141/2, George of Antioch appeared with his %eet 
o" Ifrīqiya, seizing shipments sent from Egypt to alleviate al-Mahdīya’s plight, to en-
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force payment35. Despite the renewal of the protectorate, in 1142/3 the Sicilian %eet 
attacked several coastal areas of the kingdom, claiming to act on behalf of al-Mahdīya 
against rebellious communities. !e town of Tripoli “of the West”, which had asserted 
its autonomy from al-Mahdīya under the Banū Mātrūh chiefs, was attacked in June 
1143, but Arab help enabled the Libyan town to repel the Sicilian attack36. Rearming 
in Sicily, the %eet went out again, this time burning down the Hammādid town of Dji-
djel, between Bougie and Bône. In 1144/45 the port of Bresk was taken. According to 
Ibn al-Athīr, its inhabitants were massacred, while women and children were enslaved 
and sold in Sicily “to the Muslims”. !e same fate met the inhabitants of the Kerkenna 
islands north of Djerba, which were captured in 1145/46; al-Hasan wrote to Roger to 
remind him of their bond, but Roger justi/ed his action by claiming that the islanders 
were disobedient towards al-Mahdīya37.
Ibn al-Athīr noted the following under the year 541 (= 13 June 1146-1 June 1147) 
“!is year the Franks, may God curse them, took possession of Tripoli of the West”. 
“Roger the Frank, king of Sicily”, prepared a great %eet and sent it to Tripoli, which was 
surrounded by land and by sea on the third day of Muharram (15 June). !e Tripoli-
tanians came out to combat the invaders, and the battle lasted for three days. Exploit-
ing internal divisions in Tripoli, where a town faction had expelled the Banū Mātrūh 
and brought it an Almoravid militia (the Mulattāmīn), the Sicilians took possession of 
Tripoli. Following the usual pillage of goods and capture of women, a universal amān 
was issued, allowing those who had %ed the town to return. Soon they delegated au-
thority to the Banū Mātrūh. Under Roger’s overlordship, Tripoli prospered. Accord-
ing to al-Idrīsī, who recorded the slaughter of the townsmen and the enslavement of 
their women, the town %ourished under Roger, and its district was “without equal in 
the products of the land, unlike any other inhabited place in the world”. Nevertheless, 
Roger’s geographer was careful to refer to Tripoli’s earlier period of splendour as a trad-
ing centre, blaming tribal attacks for its decline38.
In 542 (= 2 June 1147- 21 May 1148) it was the turn of Gabes to be taken by a Sicil-
ian force, exploiting a chaotic situation in that town resulting from the disputed suc-
cession to the late governor al-Rashīd. A scheming freedman named Yūsuf threatened 
al-Mahdīya to submit Gabes to Roger of Sicily, as the governors of Tripoli had done, 
unless he was allowed to place Muhammad, a minor in his in%uence, in the governor’s 
seat. Roger II duly dispatched Yūsuf his robe and charter as wālī or governor. !e emir 
al-Hasan sent an army from al-Mahdīya to quell the rebellion in Gabes, and Yūsuf met 
an ignominious death. Following this incident at Gabes, where Norman expansion was 
checked, Roger was determined to eliminate Zīrid rule at al-Mahdīya, taking advan-
tage of the widespread famine which continued to ravage the Maghrib. Indeed, if Ibn 
al-Athīr is to be trusted, “the worst came in the year 542, so that the notable families 
abandoned the towns and the countryside [of Ifrīqiya], and in their majority crossed 
over to Sicily; while the others ate each other, and there was a great mortality”39.
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!e Sicilian %eet – which, according to al-Maqrīzī, included two hundred galleys, and 
one hundred oared horse-carriers – passed by Pantelleria, where it encountered a ship 
coming from al-Mahdīya. Taking carrier pigeons from the Ifrīqiyan ship, George tried 
to deceive al-Hasan by sending him news that the Sicilian %eet was sailing eastwards to 
attack the Byzantine islands. Nevertheless, a terrible wind “unleashed by God” wrecked 
George’s plan to take al-Mahdīya by surprise. !e Sicilian commander requested al-
Mahdīya’s help to defend the rights of the young Muhammad at Gabes. Realizing that 
this was just a pretext for capturing the capital, the Zīrid ruler declared that he could 
not join the Christian force to /ght against fellow Muslims at Gabes. At the same time, 
he could not stay behind to defend his capital, because the Norman force was superior 
and it would block the city’s access to provisions. Preferring “the salvation of Muslims 
more than [his] kingdom”, the ruler and his household abandoned the city and found 
refuge in the ruins of ancient Carthage. Many of his subjects also %ed the city, while 
other Muslims hid in Christian churches. By the time the wind had abated, permitting 
the Norman ships to drop their anchors inside the port, many inhabitants were already 
gone. George entered the royal castle and took possession of the Zīrid treasure and the 
prince’s numerous concubines. Following a two-hour sack of al-Mahdīya, the pillage 
was stopped and a general amān was decreed, extending to the militiamen of the city, 
and the large numbers of inhabitants who had managed to escape. George was even 
reported to provide transports for the women and children. Having taken possession 
of al-Mahdīya, George sent armies to occupy Sfax and Sousse, treating the populations 
there with similar moderation40.
!ere can be little doubt that Rome looked favourably at the Norman annexation of 
coastal Ifrīqiya; an “Archbishop of Africa” was consecrated in 114841. According to Ibn 
al-Athīr, Roger would have conquered “the whole of Africa” were it not for his con%ict 
with Byzantium42. Towards the end of his life, there are signs that Roger wished to be 
seen as a great Christian ruler. A Norman %eet commanded by George of Antioch’s suc-
cessor in the admiralty, the eunuch Philip of al-Mahdīya, captured the city of Bône in 
1153. Upon his return, Philip was arrested and accused of having shown excessive clem-
ency towards the Muslim population. Moreover, he was charged with practising Islam 
in secret, and condemned to death. In a public display of Christian zeal, Roger had his 
former admiral burned at the stake. !e story, which was recorded by Ibn al-Athīr, was 
noted in great detail by a later editor of the chronicle of Romuald of Salerno, but the 
emphasis in the latter text is on Roger’s unimpeachable credentials as a Christian king 
– a man “consumed by love for the Christian faith” – who would not desist from pun-
ishing his closest servants for their sins43. A blow to Sicilian Muslims, Philip’s execution 
marked a traumatic ending to Roger’s reign – for “God allowed Roger to live for only 
a short time a$erwards”.
!e network established by the Sicilian thalassocracy across parts of Ifrīqiya seems to 
have extended to the important city of Tunis – the modern-day capital – only in a sec-
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ondary way. For a time, according to a Venetian source, Tunis was forced to pay tribute 
to the Norman rulers of Sicily44. !e project of Norman Ifrīqiya involved the resettle-
ment of immigrant Christians across new areas under Norman lordship. It also brought 
about new hopes for surviving Christian communities in Ifrīqiya. Very recently, a major 
study has revealed some of the complexities of the evolving relationship between the 
Norman rulers of Sicily and the papacy45. !e bene/ts accruing from the extension 
of Christian rule in the eastern Maghrib were not lost on Rome. Norman Africa, and 
the prospect of Christian expansion there, may have provided an additional motive for 
Rome’s rapprochement with Palermo in 1156. William I’s chief minister, Maio of Bari, 
a chief broker of the Siculo-Roman peace, may have shi$ed the focus from African to 
Italian politics in this crucial period, and was popularly blamed for the loss of Norman 
Africa in 1160. !e ammiratus ammiratorum Maio was assassinated later that year in 
a revolt lead by Matthew Bonello; and Maio’s character was likewise assassinated by 
‘Hugo Falcandus’ in the pages of his Liber de Regno Sicilie.
!e present contribution has underlined the medieval historian’s role in tracing the 
evolution of the relationship across the Mediterranean waters from one of commercial 
cooperation, to one of unequal exchange, to the establishment of a Sicilian protector-
ate over al-Mahdīya, and the Norman military interventions leading to a short-lived 
overlordship. It has been claimed that “Norman rule in Africa aimed to be benign”46. 
Nevertheless, a benevolent form of government, including the delegation of adminis-
trative tasks to local notables, could hardly mask the reality of subjection to a Christian 
overlord. !e accounts of the uprisings in 1158-59 leave no room for doubt; in the 
minds of Sicily’s African subjects, the bene/ts of living under a restored Muslim rule 
vastly outweighed any consideration of mild Christian government. Sporadic signs of 
resistance to Christian rule emerged in the early 1150s, notably the Djerban revolt in 
1153, which was crushed thanks to a major naval expedition, leading to the Norman 
re-conquest of the island, together with the subjection of the Kerkenna archipelago. In 
William I’s early years of rule Sicily’s %eets ranged across the Mediterranean, in a cam-
paign in the Nile Delta (1155), as well as expeditions against Byzantine Negropont and 
Muslim Ibiza (1157). At the approach of the Almohad army, a series of revolts spread 
quickly to bring the Norman presence to an end. Town a$er town rapidly subjected 
themselves to the Almohads. !e Muslim reconquista of Ifrīqiya was accelerated, ac-
cording to Ibn al-Athīr, when the Almohads created two huge mountains of wheat and 
barley. !e politics of grain were not lost on the Almohads, it seems.
!e campaign culminated in the triumphal entry of the Almohads into al-Mahdīya in 
January 1160; the Almohad caliph cAbd al-Mucmin is said to have wondered why the 
last Zīrid ruler of the city, who had become his protégée, had surrendered the fortress 
to Roger in 1148. Although a formal peace was not reached with Sicily before 1180, it 
has been shown how Genoese merchants were actively involved in linking Sicily and its 
former Ifrīqiyan domains under the new Almohad princes47.
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!e formalization of Sicilian regional hegemony in the establishment of a Norman 
Ifrīqiya was the /nal stage of a process which originated in commercial cooperation 
across the Christian-Muslim divide in the central Mediterranean. Radically redrawn 
with the Norman conquest of Sicily, the divide was shown to be bridgeable through 
peaceful commercial exchange. By the early 12th century, Sicily and Ifrīqiya were linked 
through their economic interdependence. From 1135, al-Mahdīya became a de facto 
Sicilian protectorate, and in the 1140s much of coastal Ifrīqiya was subjected to Roger 
II’s overlordship while the Zīrid state ceased to exist. By 1160 it was the turn of Rog-
er’s African dominion to meet the same fate. Ironically, the /nal Muslim victory saved 
Norman Ifrīqiya from historiographical extinction – by drawing Muslim chroniclers 
to write at length about the developments that would lead to a /nal Muslim victory. In 
doing so, they also recorded the degeneration of a relationship which, at /rst, avoided 
confrontation and turned to commercial cooperation to bridge the Christian-Muslim 
divide. Seizing on an excellent example, which foreshadowed the Muslim defeat of the 
Latin East and marked the prestigious success against a notable Christian thalassocracy, 
they became its chief narrators. Exploiting the bene/ts of hindsight, the Muslim histo-
rians reconstructed with meticulous detail the chain of events marking the rise and fall 
of Norman Ifrīqiya, relaying precious information on the making of a short-lived polity 
which, for hardly two decades, bridged the Mediterranean.
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